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Nietzsche on Redemption. A Mahayana Buddhist
Perspective
Andr van der Braak
Nietzsche often comments that he uses his “trans-European” or even
“trans-Asiatic” eye to criticize and enhance his own European culture (see
for example JGB 56). He can therefore be considered a transcultural
thinker,1 who confronts European and non-European perspectives with
each other in order to go beyond cultural assumptions and limitations.
One of those confrontations has been between Christianity and
Buddhism.
Throughout his work, Nietzsche rejected (early) Buddhism as a life-
denying, nihilistic response to the problem of suffering, the opposite of
his own Dionysian, affirmative philosophy. Nietzsche wrote in his
Nachlass “Ich kçnnte der Buddha Europas werden”, and continues with
“was freilich ein Gegenstck zum indischen wre” (KSA 10.4[2]).2
Earlier studies have viewed Nietzsche’s thought from the perspective
of early Buddhism3 and have revealed some interesting elective affinities.
Mistry and Morrison also hint at possible ways in which Nietzsche was
influenced by his knowledge of Buddhism.
However, the later Mahayana Buddhism (that Nietzsche wasn’t
acquainted with himself ), is according to Graham Parkes a much more
promising candidate for comparative research. Nietzsche might have
considered the Mahayana Buddhist philosophical ideas much to his own
1 Johann Figl, Nietzsche und die Religionen: Transkulturelle Perspektiven seines Bil-
dungs- und Denkweges, Berlin/New York 2007; Andr van der Braak, Nietzsche’s
Transcultural Hermeneutics : Proliferation versus Fusion of Horizons, in: Fran-
cisco Arenas-Dolz, Luca Giancristofaro, Paolo Stellini (eds.), Nietzsche y la
Hermenutica, Valencia 2007, pp. 79– 88.
2 For an overview of Nietzsche’s use of the term “Buddhismus”, see my article in
Paul van Tongeren, Gerd Schank, Herman Siemens (eds.), Nietzsche-Wçrterbuch,
Bd. 1: Abbreviatur-einfach, Berlin/New York 2004, pp. 419– 433.
3 Freny Mistry, Nietzsche and Buddhism: Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study,
Berlin/New York 1981; Robert Morrison, Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in









































taste.4 This essay will therefore use Mahayana Buddhism as an
interpretative lens to view Nietzsche’s thought, particularly with respect
to redemption.
The past years have seen a renewed interest in Nietzsche as a
soteriological thinker, for whom the concept of redemption plays an
important role.5 Throughout Nietzsche’s work, a perplexing range of
perspectives on this subject can be found. Contrary to what one might
expect, Nietzsche uses the term not only in a negative sense. In various
places, but especially in Also sprach Zarathustra, he attempts to elucidate a
new and positive form of redemption.6 After presenting Nietzsche’s
perspectives on redemption, this essay will present a Mahayana Buddhist
view on redemption, in order to suggest a possible interpretation of
Nietzsche’s views on redemption.
Nietzsche on redemption
Nietzsche mostly speaks about redemption as a criticized theological
concept, as part of his battle against Christianity.7 Nietzsche’s critique is
first of all a psychological one. Starting with Menschliches, Allzumens-
chliches, and continuing into the later work, Nietzsche exposes the false
psychology of redemption. He attempts to give a non-mythological and
purely psychological explanation for the need for redemption (MA I
132): it is based on fantasy and fiction (MA I 135, 476). He also explains
the feeling of redemption as an interpretation of well being (KSA
11.44[6]). Redemption is connected with the idea of sin, which Nietzsche
criticizes as an imaginary concept (KSA 9.5[33], KSA 9.7[251]).
Also the state of redemption itself is unmasked by Nietzsche as
imaginary: he rejects it as an illusion (FW 335), an imaginary “Wirkung
4 Graham Parkes (ed.), Nietzsche and Asian Thought, Chicago 1991, p. 15.
5 Gilles Fraser, Redeeming Nietzsche. On the Piety of Unbelief, London 2002; Andr
van der Braak, Hoe men wordt, wat men is : zelfvervolmaking, zelfoverwinning en
zelfvergetelheid bij Nietzsche, Budel 2004.
6 See my forthcoming article on “Erlçsung” in Paul van Tongeren, Gerd Schank,
Herman Siemens (eds.), Nietzsche-Wçrterbuch, Bd. 2, Berlin/New York 2008
(forthcoming).
7 During his early period (GT through UB), Nietzsche uses redemption to describe
an artistic and metaphysical phenomenon. Since this meaning of redemption is
influenced by Wagner and Schopenhauer, and quite specific to the early work, I
will not focus on it in this essay.









































und Verwandlung” (KSA 9.4[89], AC 15), as “Lge und Falschmnzerei”
(AC 38), and as a psychological reality based on the imagination (KSA
13.11[383], AC 33).
Later on, Nietzsche’s psychological critique is joined by a genealogical
critique. Redemption is viewed as an expression of resentment. Through
its connection with sin, redemption serves to stimulate submission to the
priests (AC 26). It also serves to condemn life (MA I 16, KSA
13.11[265], KSA 13.14[89]). Within the ascetic ideal, redemption
functions as a reward for suffering: by suffering here on earth one can
experience redemption in the afterlife. As Nietzsche analyzes in Zur
Genealogie der Moral, the ascetic priest develops a new way to deal with
suffering by reinterpreting it as sin, and redirecting resentment within.
The notions of sin and redemption point the blame for suffering back at
the sufferer. Suffering is reinterpreted as a necessary pathway to
redemption. By giving this meaning to suffering, it is made bearable.
For the priests, resentment came to be built into the very fabric of
redemption. They developed a theology of guilt, sin and redemption,
which allowed them to be the mediators of a complex mechanism of
reward and punishment. Redemption became an instrument of violence
and revenge.
In his late work, Nietzsche’s psychological and genealogical critique is
joined by a physiological critique: the need for redemption is a sign of
decadence (WA Nachschrift 1). Redemption is claimed to be a cure but
in reality, it makes the patient even more ill. The Christian Buss-und
Erlçsungstraining leads to epileptic symptoms (GM III 21) and to
Erlçsungs-Hysterie (EH Schicksal). As a “Systematisirung des Zerstçrer-
Instinkt” (KSA 13.14[164]), redemption is a symptom of a morality of
decadence (KSA 13.14[210]). For Nietzsche, Christian redemption
doesn’t liberate and heal people, it reinforces their bondage.
For the late Nietzsche, redemption is connected with nihilism.
According to Nietzsche, both Christianity and Buddhism define
redemption as the absence of pain and suffering. The state of redemption
is one of total “Gesammt-Hypnotisirung und Stille” (GM III 17), a state of
deep sleep, whether interpreted as becoming one with Brahman, or as a
unio mystica with God (GM III 17). Redemption becomes synonymous
with “nothing” (AC 7).









































Redemption in a positive sense
But interestingly enough, for every type of criticism of redemption,
Nietzsche hints at a positive counterpart, to be contrasted with the
negative redemption.
When he speaks about redemption as part of Christian morality, he
envisages self-liberation (Selbsterlçsung) as an emancipation from the need
for redemption (MA 134). Realizing that “everything is necessity” can
liberate the free spirit from his (imaginary) sense of sinfulness and guilt,
and his need for redemption of this sinfulness (MA 107).8 A redeemer
becomes superfluous, just like in the time of the Buddha, the teacher of
the religion of Selbsterlçsung (M 96). By un-learning the moral prejudices,
the free spirit can liberate himself from the greatest illness of humanity:
Christian morality (KSA 9.4[315]).9 By denying the truth of moral
judgments, the free spirit is also “von der Skepsis erlçst” (M 477). He is
now free to deny again, rather than having to suspend his judgment.10
When Nietzsche speaks about redemption as part and parcel of
nihilism, he speaks about the self-overcoming of nihilism. Just like
Nietzsche analyzes Christian redemption in physiological terms as a
sickness born out of decadence, he speaks about positive redemption in
medical terms: as being cured from decadence and the sickening effects of
Christian redemption.
In “Von der Erlçsung”, Zarathustra speaks about redemption first of
all as a creative reinterpretation of the past, in order to justify it. “Die
Vergangenen zu erlçsen und alle ‘Es war’ umzuschaffen in ein ‘so wollte
ich es !’—das hiesse mir erst Erlçsung!” (Z II Erlçsung). But then the will
discovers that it is powerless to change the past. It becomes infected with
the spirit of revenge. Redemption now refers to a liberation from the
world of appearances (“Erlçsung vom Fluss der Dinge”, Z II Erlçsung),
which culminates in not willing anymore: “Es sei denn, dass der Wille
endlich sich selber erlçste und Wollen zu Nicht-Wollen wrde—– doch
ihr kennt, meine Brder, diess Fabellied des Wahnsinns!”(Z II Erlçsung).
The will can only be truly liberated—and liberating—when it is
healed from revenge. True redemption would therefore amount to a cure
8 See Marco Brusotti, Die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis : Philosophie und sthetische
Lebensgestaltung bei Nietzsche von Morgenrçthe bis Also sprach Zarathustra,
Berlin/New York 1997, p. 11.
9 See ibd., p. 109.
10 Ibd., p. 303.









































from revenge. It can be viewed as the extreme self-overcoming of the will
to power.11 The will to power has to learn to will the eternal recurrence.12
Such a redemption of the will is, according to Brusotti, the final goal of
Nietzsche’s philosophy.13
But how are we to think such a redemption of the will? What would
the self-overcoming of the will to power look like? In order to be
consistent with Nietzsche’s thought as a whole, redemption can’t refer to a
particular state or resolution of conflict, nor can it consist of filling a lack.
Such a redemption would, according to Nietzsche, be a symptom of
degenerated, reactive life. The very attempt to overcome the ascetic ideal
would then, ironically enough, be a symptom of that ascetic ideal itself.
Redemption can’t be a synthesis of opposites or extinguishing struggle
and conflict.
A second problematic aspect of any Nietzschean soteriology is that it
can’t be interpreted as a teleological imperative. It can’t be grasped as a
means to arrive at some end projected in the future. Nietzsche criticizes
any ideal of conscious self-cultivation and self-overcoming as an
expression of decadence and resentment. From the healthy affirmative,
Dionysian point of view everything is perfect as it is, and nothing needs
to be changed or improved.
With these questions in mind, let us now turn to the philosophical
tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, and its views on redemption.
Redemption in Mahayana Buddhism
In early Buddhism, redemption (nirvana) is consistently interpreted as
the cessation of suffering, a state of liberation from worldly existence
(samsara) that can be reached through a practice of self-cultivation and
meditation. True to their radical empiricist and anti-metaphysical stance,
the early Buddhist texts offer hardly any explicit positive indications of
what nirvana is, only what it is not. This reticence to give a positive
determination to nirvana has caused nineteenth-century interpreters of
11 Ibd., p. 574.
12 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of “Thus Spake
Zarathustra”, New Haven 1986, p. 147.
13 Brusotti, Die Leidenschaft, p. 571.









































Buddhism (including Nietzsche) to misinterpret nirvana as a “will to
nothingness”.14
The later Mahayana Buddhism, however, approaches nirvana in a
much more multi-perspectival way. It uses the notion of “expedient
means” (Sk. upya), to allow for the possibility of different layers of
teaching. Some perspectives are more exoteric, aimed at a large audience,
and others are more esoteric, not in the sense of ‘secret’, but for those
further along the Buddhist path.
One of the more esoteric teachings is that of the nondual relationship
between nirvana and samsara. In the famous formulation of the second-
century Buddhist thinker Nagarjuna: “The limits (i. e. realm) of nirvana
are the limits of samsara. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest
difference whatsoever.”15 Nirvana doesn’t refer to escaping or overcoming
samsara in order to reach a state of everlasting bliss (analogous to the
Christian notion of redemption). It means moving beyond the exoteric
perspective on nirvana as a state separate from samsara, and realizing the
esoteric perspective that there is no difference between samsara and
nirvana. As Jay Garfield puts it, this is “a nirvana not found in an escape
from the world but in an enlightened and awakened engagement with
it.”16 Nirvana implies a different, more affirmative perspective on living
in this world. The early Buddhist notion of nirvana as a liberation from
samsara is not considered wrong or untrue, but is seen as a preliminary
perspective for those starting out on the Buddhist path. Once one has
progressed on the path, one is ready for the more advanced nondual
perspective that nirvana and samsara are the same.
In contemporary Japanese Mahayana Buddhism, nirvana is inter-
preted as a “dynamic dialectic of reaffirmation through double
negation”.17 The first negation is the ascetic overcoming of the craving
and ignorance that bind us. This could be likened to the nihilistic view of
nirvana as an escape from samsara. However, this negation has to be
followed up by an equally necessary second negation: a negation of any
14 See Roger Pol-Droit, The Cult of Nothingness. The Philosophers and the Buddha,
North Carolina 2003.
15 Kenneth Inada, Nagarjuna. A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika with an
Introductory Essay, Delhi 1993, p. 158.
16 Jay Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s
Mulamadhyamakakarika, Oxford 1995, p. 341.
17 Bret Davis, Zen After Zarathustra: The Problem of the Will in the
Confrontation Between Nietzsche and Buddhism, in: Journal of Nietzsche
Studies 28 (2004), pp. 89 – 138, here p. 99.









































attachment to a transcendent repose in the realm of nirvana. As Davis
puts it: “The event of nirvana thus paradoxically completes itself only in a
movement through its own negation.”18 Any dualistic perspectives on
nirvana, as a state separate from and superior to samsara, have to be
overcome, and a nondualistic perspective on nirvana needs to be realized.
Such a multilayered perspectival approach to redemption could
perhaps also fruitfully be applied to Nietzsche’s views on redemption.
Nietzsche himself uses the famous image of the three transformations of
the spirit : the camel, the lion and the child (Z I Verwandlungen). The
camel seeks truth and liberation from within his own cultural tradition.
He voluntarily takes on the heaviest burdens, and subjects himself to the
norms and values of that tradition (i. e. , Christian redemption).
Eventually, he will end up in the desert, where he has to fight the
dragon of the “thou shalt”. If his Selbsterlçsung is victorious, he transforms
into an autonomous lion, who says “I will”, rather than “thou shalt”. The
lion is able to give himself his own laws as a sovereign individual,
“philosophize with the hammer”, and destroy the established values of his
culture. He is however still driven by revenge, and therefore not capable
of creating new values. By going under, voluntarily giving up the power
of the “I will”, the lion is transformed into a child.
The Mahayanistic “dynamic dialectic of reaffirmation through
double negation” can be used to interpret the camel-lion-child trans-
formations. The first negation (nirvana as a liberation from samsara) can
be likened to the camel who seeks to become master over himself. Striving
after redemption under the yoke of Christian morality, the camel can use
the notion of will to power to liberate himself from this false notion of
redemption and transform into a lion (Selbsterlçsung). The lion however,
has to be liberated from this Selbsterlçsung as well. This is the second
negation: the notion of will to power itself has to be left behind, in order
to make room for a dynamic reaffirmation of existence just as it is (amor
fati). For this to occur, the will to power has to overcome itself.
Nietzsche’s Nachlass contains the following intriguing fragment:
Exoterisch—esoterisch
1.—alles ist Wille gegen Willen
2 Es giebt gar keinen Willen
1 Causalismus
2 Es giebt nichts wie Ursache-Wirkung (KSA 12.5[9])
18 Ibd.









































One way to interpret this fragment is that Nietzsche intended his thesis of
the will to power as an exoteric, preliminary teaching, a useful tool on the
way to redemption. Camels can use the will to power as a counter-
perspective that will help them to liberate themselves from the “thou
shalt” of their culture. Lions can use the will to power as the hammer to
philosophize with: smashing the idols of their culture in a practice of
active nihilism. But eventually the will to power has to be recognized as
an exoteric perspective. From an esoteric perspective (viewed from above,
as Nietzsche explains in JGB 30), “es giebt gar keinen Willen”. The very
notion of “will” must ultimately been seen through as illusory.
Some researchers have interpreted Nietzsche’s philosophy as an anti-
soteriology, aimed at maximizing the struggle without any redemption
whatsoever, a maximization rather than a self-overcoming of the will to
power.19 In our interpretation, will to power becomes a differential
concept that functions differently for different types of people. For
camels, it would serve to lessen confidence in Christian morality. For
lions, it would express the sense of sovereignty and autonomy, the “I will”
of the lion. Maximizing the will to power would be a lion-stage teaching,
whereas the self-overcoming of the will to power would represent the
transformation of lion into child.
As Davis also notes, on one hand will to power can be interpreted as
Nietzsche’s inversion of the nihilistic redemptive notion of will-lessness
that dominates Christianity (and Buddhism, in Nietzsche’s view): rather
than to be extinguished, the will needs to be maximized. But it would be
inconsistent for Nietzsche to stop at a mere countermovement, a mere
“anti”. Perhaps then, just like, as Heidegger said, Nietzsche’s Umdrehung
of Platonism turned into a Herausdrehung, “so too he would move
beyond both the simple denial and the simple affirmation of the will to
power”.20 This would be a fine example of “the dynamic dialectic of
reaffirmation through double negation”. First the will to power serves as a
counter-notion in order to negate the ideal of will-lessness; then the
notion of will to power itself has to be overcome as well. As an exoteric
conviction, it has outlived its usefulness.
Nietzsche himself wrote that after Zarathustra, all his writings were
fish hooks (EH JGB 1): books for camels that he hoped to lure into the
19 E. g. Paul van Tongeren, Reinterpreting Modern Culture: An Introduction to
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Philosophy, Lafayette 2004.
20 Davis, Zen After Zarathustra, p. 115.









































desert. The convictions expressed in those books should be read as
exoteric teachings, aimed at educating his audience.
A similar spirit can be discerned in the writings of Mahayana
Buddhism. Whereas early Buddhism is more austere and skeptical in its
philosophical views, Mahayana Buddhism is “von der Skepsis erlçst”, just
like Nietzsche in M 477. Like Zarathustra, Mahayana Buddhism has
embraced the great skepsis, that allows one to play with convictions (AC
54). Its multi-perspectival notion of nirvana can therefore be a useful
hermeneutic tool for interpreting Nietzsche’s views on redemption.
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